A Cut And Choose Mechanism to Prevent Gerrymandering me nonarchival 2018 July Stony Brook 29th International Conference on Game Theory http://www.gtcenter.org/?page=Archive/2018/ConfSchedule.html USA NY Stony Brook arXiv https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.08351 This paper presents a novel mechanism to endogenously determine the fair division of a state into electoral districts in a two-party setting. No geometric constraints are imposed on voter distributions or district shapes; instead, it is assumed that any partition of the population into districts of equal population is feasible. One party divides the map, then the other party chooses a minimum threshold level of support needed to win a district. Districts in which neither party meets this threshold are awarded randomly. Despite the inherent asymmetry, the equilibria of this mechanism always yield fair outcomes, up to integer rounding.